Managerial Decisions On Annual Earnings Announcement Timing by Yang, Xiaolou & Yang, Rong
The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2011 Volume 27, Number 6 
© 2011 The Clute Institute  23 
Managerial Decisions On Annual Earnings 
Announcement Timing 
Xiaolou Yang, Youngstown State University, USA 
Rong Yang, SUNY - College at Brockport, USA 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the mid-to-long term impacts of Regulation Fair 
Disclosure (FD) on managerial decisions of annual earnings announcement dates. Empirical 
results indicate a significant negative effect of Regulation FD on the timing of firm’s information 
disclosure: first, the annual earning releasing time is delayed for both open-call and close-call 
firms after Regulation FD; second, an unexpected delay in earnings releasing is pronounced for 
closed-call firms than for open-call firms in the pre-FD period; moreover,  a significant difference 
in disclosure timing made between the open-call and close-call firms does not disappear in the 
post-FD period. Our finding provides additional evidence of the unintended consequence of 
Regulation FD: a delay in annual earnings releasing time.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
n October 23, 2000, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued Regulation Fair 
Disclosure (FD), which requires that, if and when a firm discloses material information to certain 
financial analysts and institutional investors, it must make the same information available to the public 
simultaneously. The SEC and proponents of the rule claimed that Regulation FD could increase the flow of 
information, level the playing field for financial analysts and inventors, and eliminate selective disclosure. Critics of 
the rule asserted that Regulation FD could reduce the quantity of information released, resulting in more market 
volatility due to the increased information asymmetry between management and outsiders.  
 
Nevertheless, Regulation FD did not mandate a particular timing and the content of earnings 
announcements, except for requiring the disclosure to be made by a “method (or combination of methods) of 
disclosure that is reasonably designed to provide broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information to the 
public” (see the SEC Release No. 33-8128).  Firms have substantial discretion in the timing and informativeness of 
the disclosures and the amount of details provided. Without the legal right of partial disclosure, firms have to bear 
all the cost of fair disclosure, in particular, which may result in a negative market response due to a “non-optimal” 
timing of earnings announcements. Consequently, managers may reassess earnings disclosure timing (days between 
the fiscal year-end and annual earnings releasing date) decisions and reevaluate if the benefit of delaying the formal 
release of earnings exceeds the cost after Regulation FD. Alternatively, managers may have an increased incentive 
to control for their annual earnings releasing time in order to reduce (increase) the cost (benefit) associated with the 
post-earnings-announcement market fluctuations after the enactment of Regulation FD.  
 
Prior studies on Regulation FD have focused on its impact on stock markets, such as price volatility and 
information flows (Bushee, Matsumoto and Miller, 2004; Heflin, Subramanyam and Zhang, 2003; Eleswarapu, 
Thompson and Venkataraman, 2004; Francis et al., 2006; Bailey et al., 2003; Mathew, Hughen and Ragan, 2004; 
Irani and Karamanou, 2004; Shane, Soderstorm and Yoon, 2001), the informativeness of analysts earnings forecasts 
in the post-FD environment (Gintschel and Markov, 2004; Yang and Mensah, 2006), and information asymmetry 
using bid-ask spreads (Lee et al., 2004).  A number of published studies have specifically examined the impact of 
Regulation FD on managerial disclosure, and their findings have been mixed. For example, Bushee, Matsumoto and 
Miller (2003) find that Regulation FD had a negative effect on managers’ decisions to continue hosting conference  
calls even though the magnitude of this change is not large; their results indicate an increase in the price volatility 
O 
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and individual investor trading after Regulation FD. Heflin, Subramanyam and Zhang (2003) find improved 
information efficiency of stock prices prior to earnings announcements and a substantial increase in the volume of 
firms’ voluntary earnings-related disclosures after Regulation FD.  
 
However, none of the prior studies attempted to examine the timing of annual earnings announcement in 
the post-FD period as compared to the pre-FD period. There are no direct answers about when, from managerial 
aspect, to make a public release of their annual reports and how that has been changed after Regulation FD. The 
purpose of our study is to investigate the impact of Regulation FD on managerial decisions on annual earnings 
announcement timing.  
 
Previous studies on Regulation FD face the difficulty of isolating Regulation FD’s effect from other market 
influences over the past six years, such as the U.S. recession and the bursting of the Internet stock bubble. For 
instance, the post-FD observations (November 2000 to June 2001) are likely from the post Internet meltdown 
period, while the pre-FD observations (November 1999 to June 2000) are likely from the height of the Internet 
boom. In this study, in an effort to isolate Regulation FD's effect, we split the data into two group: (1) the closed 
conference call (CLC) firms, which restricted the access of their calls to only selected analysts and professional 
investors in the pre-FD period, and (2) the open conference call (OPC) firms, which voluntarily provided unlimited 
real-time access to conference calls prior to Regulation FD. With respect to conference calls, firms already hosting 
open calls were most likely unaffected. Moreover, because controlling for other time-period-specific factors is 
critical to properly identify the effects of the regulation, we use these OPC firms (the least affected by Regulation 
FD) as a control sample against CLC firms (directly affected by Regulation FD). Specifically, we expect the impact 
of Regulation FD to be more significant for CLC firms. Given that the new rule did not affect the level of access to 
calls for OPC firms, these firms provide a benchmark that helps isolate the effect of Regulation FD from other 
changes in the economy over the sample period.  
 
Based on the sample period of 1993-2005, we find that both CLC and OPC firms delayed their annual 
reports in the post-FD period as compared to the pre-FD period. An unexpected delay in earnings releasing is longer 
for closed-call firms than for open-call firms before Regulation FD. Such a difference in the disclosure timing does 
not disappear between CLC and OPC firms in the post-FD period.  This study provides evidence of a negative 
impact of Regulation FD on managerial disclosure decisions on annual earnings announcement dates. Our findings 
have important implications for corporate management and regulation, and provide insight for stock market 
reactions to managerial information.  
 
This study is a novel investigation, which provides a valuable extension to the effects of Regulation FD on 
managerial decisions. This is the first attempt to examine the disclosure timing choice in the context of Regulation 
FD. Second, we isolate the influence of Regulation FD by splitting the data into two groups: CLC firms versus OPC 
firms in order to control for other time-period-specific factors. Third, we expand the post-FD period to five years to 
examine the mid-to-long-term effect of Regulation FD, whereas most other studies use only a one or two-year short-
term window. To sum up, these findings are important since the timing of annual earnings report sends the signaling 
content of future earnings guidance. As a result, it provides valuable information to investors, financial analysts and 
other market participants.  
 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Hypotheses are developed in Section 2.  Section 3 
describes the sample selection procedure. Section 4 discusses research methodology. Section 5 presents the analysis 
of empirical results and additional tests. Section 6 concludes the paper and provides suggestions for further research. 
 
2. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Prior to Regulation FD, most conference calls were accessible only to favored analysts and institutional 
shareholders. Meanwhile, prior studies provide evidence that open conference calls are associated with the 
complexity of its financial information, a greater increase in small trades and higher price volatility during the call 
period (Bowen, Davis, and Matsumoto 2003). It is expected that there would be a significant difference in earnings 
releasing time between the CLC firms and OPC firms before the implementation of Regulation FD. Previous-CLC 
firms had to comply with this new regulation. It is more likely that difference in earnings releasing time does not 
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disappear between the CLC firms and OPC firms in the post-FD period. Therefore, we developed the following 
three hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis I: Both CLC and OPC firms are more likely to delay their annual reports in the post-FD period as 
compared to the pre-FD period.  
Hypothesis II: An unexpected delay in earnings releasing is longer for close-call firms compared to open-call 
firms before the Regulation FD.  
Hypothesis III:  A significant difference in the disclosure timing between the open-call and close-call firms is not 
likely to disappear in the post-FD period. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
 
As mentioned earlier, there has been an ongoing debate on whether Regulation FD promotes a better 
information flow by eliminating selective disclosure or reduces the quantity and quality of information that a firm is 
willing to release to the market. This question is worth investigating when such an issue is put into the context of 
managerial timing decisions on earnings released to the public, because managers may announce their earnings in a 
timely or delayed manner in order to reduce negative market response.  Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that 
certain analysts and institutional investors who were privy to material nonpublic information would have an edge 
over other market participants in the pre-FD period whereas such practices are not allowed in the post-FD period. To 
determine if Regulation FD had an effect on the firms’ disclosure decisions, we examine the changes in earnings 
releasing time after the enactment of Regulation FD for firms with different conference-call status.   
 
We adapt the earnings release model used in Sengupta’s (2004) study to test our hypotheses. There are 
three variables, institutional investors, shareholder blocks and outside directors, are not available for our sample 
period, therefore are excluded from our model.  
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Where 
 
RELEASING_TIME= The number of calendar days between the fiscal-year end and the date of the actual annual 
earnings announcement for firm i at year t. 
POST_FD= Dummy variable for the period after the issue of Regulation FD in October 2000. 
CLC= Dummy variable for firms which held closed conference calls in the periods before 
Regulation FD was adopted.  
VOL= Total number of shares traded over the fiscal year divided by total shares outstanding at 
fiscal year end. 
TECH= 1 if a firm belongs to Drugs (Compustat SIC codes 2833-2836), R&D Services (8731-
8734), Programming (7371-7379), Computers (3570-3577), Electronics (3600-2674); 0 
otherwise (See Sengupta 2004). 
MB= The ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity at the end of year i. 
CONS= 
 
Sales of the 5 largest firms within a two-digit SIC code divided by total sales of all firms 
within the two-digit SIC code. 
SPECIAL= 1 if a firm had report non-zero special items in its annual report; 0, otherwise. 
LSALES= Log of total sales for the fiscal year. 
BADNEWS= 1 if the actual EPS is less than the consensus forecast (median) for firm i at year t; 
LOSS= 1 if the actual EPS of firm i is less than zero; 0 otherwise. 
DISP= Standard deviation of analyst forecasts for firm i from the mean of analysts’ forecasts 
deflated  by the median of analyst forecast for firm i. 
N_ANA= Total number of earnings forecasts outstanding for a firm for quarter t. 
 
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2011 Volume 27, Number 6 
26 © 2011 The Clute Institute 
Test 1: 1 >0      Existence of an overall increase in the releasing time in the post-FD period compared to the pre-
FD period for both OPC and CLC firms. (H1) 
 
Test 2: 2 > 0     Increased delay in earnings releasing for CLC firms compared to OPC firms before Regulation 
FD. (H2) 
 
Test 3: 2 + 3  0    A significant difference in disclosure timing between the open-call and close-call firms 
doesn’t disappear in the post-FD period (H3).  
 
A positive 1 indicates that the annual earnings announcements delayed on average in the post-FD period 
compared to the pre-FD period.  2  limits the test to the CLC firms only and evaluates whether there is an extra 
delay on CLC firms compared to OPC firms. A positive alpha 2 indicates an unexpected delay in earnings releasing 
is longer for closed-call firms than for open-call firms before the Regulation FD, supporting hypothesis 2. Test 3 
evaluates whether Regulation FD had a differential effect on the earnings releasing time for CLC firms relative to 
OPC firms. If there is significant difference in disclosure timing between CLC and OPC firms in the post-FD period, 
then 1 + 3 should be significantly different from zero, consistent with hypothesis 3. 
 
We use the trading volume as a proxy for investor base since prior research suggests that investors are 
likely to trade more for a timely disclosure. Therefore, a negative relationship is expected between trading volume 
and reporting days (RELEASING_TIME). According to Bamber and Cheon (1998), sales concentration (CONS) 
and market-to-book ratio (MB) are included as a proxy for proprietary costs, which is positively associated with 
RELEASING_TIME. We also include SPECIAL to measure accounting complexity because firms with special 
items need more processing time than other firms. Hence there is a positive relationship between SPECIAL and 
releasing time. We include the variable TECH because firms with a higher level of litigation cost provide managers 
with incentives to pre-disclose the information to the public, consistent with findings by Skinner (1994, 1997). As a 
result, TECH is negatively associated with firms’ earnings reporting time. We include both BADNEWS and LOSS 
because prior research shows that unexpected delay in releasing earnings is longer for firms if their actual EPS is 
less than the median forecast, consistent with the findings by Begley and Fischer (1998) and Ajinkya et al. (2004). If 
there is a large disagreement among financial analysts, firms may face more difficulty in releasing earnings to the 
public, and therefore, there is a positive correlation between forecast dispersion and releasing time. Finally, the 
number of analysts following firms (N_ANA) and firm size (LSALES) are included as a proxy for the richness of a 
firm’s information environment. Prior research provides evidence showing that the greater information environment 
uncertainty, the less the delayed disclosures will be. So a negative relationship is expected between the releasing 
time and N_ANA, and LSALES. 
 
4. DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
The sample used for this study consisted of firms listed by Bestcalls.com in March 1999 as hosting 
conference calls open to individual investors. The firms listed on this site are identified as Open Conference Call 
(OPC) firms and are regarded as a control group since Regulation FD (which came into effect in October 2000) is 
unlikely to have affected them. Around the same date in 1999, First Call Corporation had a listing of firms hosting 
conference calls (Bowen, Matsumoto, and Davis, 2002: 285). By cross-matching those firms on the First Call list 
with those on the Bestcalls list, those cross-matched firms excluded from the Bestcalls list could be identified as 
Closed Conference Call (CLC) firms. Since these firms are those most directly affected by Regulation FD, we 
regard these firms as our treatment group. This classification methodology is consistent with the method used by 
Bushee, Matsumoto and Miller (2004). We acknowledge that this identification process may result in the 
misclassification of some firms which held conference calls in the prior years but not in 1999. In spite of these 
potential limitations, our classification procedure has value in that it allows the effect of Regulation FD, on firms 
whose conference call status was known, to be evaluated in a cleaner version. Further, the control variables, firm 
size, growth opportunity, special items, predicted loss and tech are collected from COMPUSTAT. Also, we collect 
analysts’ annual earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S database for all firms during a period of 1993-2005. 
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Table 1 
Comparisons in the Means (Medians) of Releasing Time 
 
Mean of 
Releasing Time 
 Median of 
Releasing Time 
 
YEAR CLC Group OPC Group 
Difference 
(t-test) CLC Group OPC Group 
Difference 
(Wilcox test) 
1993 37.426 34.011 3.415** 35 33.5 1.5** 
1994 37.067 33.721 3.346** 36.5 33 3.5** 
1995 36.883 32.594 4.289*** 36 31 5*** 
1996 36.699 32.136 4.563*** 36 30 6*** 
1997 38.076 32.609 5.467*** 36 29 7*** 
1998 39.191 33.237 5.954*** 36 30 6*** 
1999 38.421 32.434 5.987*** 35 29 6*** 
2000 37.265 32.056 5.209*** 36 30 6*** 
2001 37.657 32.05 5.607*** 36 30 6*** 
2002 38.123 33.764 4.359*** 37 30 7*** 
2003 38.909 33.846 5.063*** 37 30 7*** 
2004 40.265 35.206 5.059*** 39 32 7*** 
2005 42.375 36.78 5.595*** 40 33 7*** 
Note: *** Probability of below 0.001. 
           ** Probability of below 0.01. 
           * Probability of below 0.05. 
 
 
The initial sample consisted of 1,365 OPC and 17,252 CLC firms. Of these total 18,617 firms, we began 
our sample selection by identifying all firms from I/B/E/S that reported analyst forecast data and annual earnings 
announcement dates during the period from 1993 to 2005. To ensure the meaningful computation of forecast 
dispersion, the minimum number of analyst following is set to 4. We deleted the firms with missing annual I/B/E/S 
forecast data and annual COMPUSTAT data during the period (fiscal years ending in the calendar years 1993 to 
2005). Then we deleted 3,512 observations for those firms with releasing time either less than seven days after the 
fiscal year-end or more than 90 days after the fiscal year. We believe those extreme values regarded as outliers may 
cause some potential errors. After imposing these restrictions, the final sample consisted of 8,281 firm-year 
observations.  
 
 
Figure 1 
Time Series Distribution of Firms’ Annual Report Releasing Time 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables of Interest in Pre and Post Regulation FD Periods 
 
In PRE Regulation FD Period 
 
In POST Regulation FD Period 
  
Standard 
    
Standard 
  
 
Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 
Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum 
CLC Group 
         RELEASING_TIME 37.04 12.87 8 83 
 
38.52 13.10 9 90 
VOL 1.31 1.37 0.00 13.87 
 
2.12 1.83 0.01 18.07 
TECH 0.15 0.36 0 1 
 
0.27 0.45 0 1 
MB 3.23 14.61 -647.59 129.19 
 
3.86 12.78 -197.72 297.23 
CONS 0.54 0.23 0.10 1.00 
 
0.56 0.22 0.11 1.00 
SPECIAL 0.39 0.49 0 1 
 
0.60 0.49 0 1 
LSALES 6.43 1.63 -3.69 11.82 
 
6.62 1.91 -6.91 12.11 
BADNEWS 0.33 0.47 0 1 
 
0.26 0.44 0 1 
LOSS 0.06 0.24 0 1 
 
0.15 0.36 0 1 
DISP 0.03 0.09 -0.55 0.5 
 
0.02 0.08 -0.5 0.5 
N_ANA 10.13 6.83 4 47 
 
9.57 5.58 4 38 
          OPC Group 
         RELEASING_TIME 32.03 12.35 8 83 
 
33.05 11.98 8 77 
VOL 1.90 2.01 0.08 19.55 
 
2.61 2.42 0.09 33.90 
TECH 0.32 0.47 0 1 
 
0.41 0.49 0 1 
MB 4.72 19.41 -64.05 655.71 
 
4.26 10.99 -265.28 115.84 
CONS 0.57 0.22 0.10 1.00 
 
0.58 0.19 0.11 1.00 
SPECIAL 0.47 0.50 0 1 
 
0.70 0.46 0 1 
LSALES 6.78 1.73 -2.59 11.99 
 
6.93 1.74 -0.91 12.24 
BADNEWS 0.29 0.45 0 1 
 
0.22 0.42 0 1 
LOSS 0.05 0.22 0 1 
 
0.15 0.36 0 1 
DISP 0.02 0.07 -0.5 0.428 
 
0.01 0.08 -0.5 0.5 
N_ANA 12.52 8.27 4 44 
 
12.25 7.43 4 40 
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Table 3 
Correlations among Variables of Interest in Pre and Post Regulation FD Periods 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) RELEASING_TIME  1 
            (2) POST_FD 0.041 1 
           (3) CLC 0.182 -0.012 1 
          (4) VOL -0.081 0.198 -0.133 1 
         (5) TECH -0.114 0.127 -0.157 0.38 1 
        (6) MB -0.022 0.009 -0.028 0.06 0.088 1 
       (7) CONS 0.036 -0.028 0.011 0.057 0.032 -0.012 1 
      (8) SPECIAL -0.046 0.040 -0.053 0.129 0.161 0.009 0.041 1 
     (9) LSALES -0.258 0.051 -0.088 -0.2 -0.307 -0.022 -0.04 0.161 1 
    (10) BADNEWS 0.087 -0.074 0.044 -0.074 -0.041 -0.003 -0.036 0.012 -0.039 1 
   (11) LOSS 0.105 0.145 0.011 0.111 0.292 0.021 0.027 0.099 -0.398 0.086 1 
  (12) DISP 0.02 -0.061 0.024 -0.047 -0.115 -0.013 -0.041 -0.008 0.102 0.029 -0.522 1 
 (13) N_ANA -0.321 -0.030 -0.175 0.108 0.106 0.049 -0.084 0.124 0.521 -0.035 -0.125 -0.011 1 
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Table 1 presents the year-by-year distribution of releasing time during a period of 1993-2005 for both OPC 
and CLC firms. The results indicate a slight increasing trend in both mean and median of releasing time for all firms 
including OPC and CLC groups over thirteen years. This is consistent with Sengupta’s (2004) finding using data 
over 1995 - 2000. More importantly, we find on average the mean (median) of releasing time for CLC firms is 
greater than that for OPC firms during both pre- and post-FD periods. In Table 1, the t-test is test for the means of 
releasing time and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is test for the medians.  We find that both means and medians 
for closed-call firms are significantly different from those for open-call firms each year.  Figure 1 describes the time-
series distribution of firms’ reporting time, consistent with the tendency of means (medians) in releasing time for 
OPC and CLC firms from Table 1.  
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the sample data partitioned by the pre-FD period and post-FD 
period. The results indicate that the releasing days of CLC firms (37.04) is significantly greater than those of OPC 
firms (32.03) before Regulation FD took effect. The same results are obtained for the post-FD period, which is likely 
to suggest that the previous CLC firms face more difficulty in making their annual announcements as compared to 
OPC firms both before and after the release of Regulation FD. That is, a timely disclosure made by OPC firms is 
observed as compared to CLC firms in the pre- and post-FD periods. Finally, descriptive statistics for the 
independent and control variables show that those variables within each group in the pre- and post-FD periods are 
similar in the magnitude of trading volume, sales concentration, forecast dispersion, firm size, and the number of 
analyst following, etc.  
 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between annual releasing time and its determinants. 
The indicator variable of Regulation FD is significantly and positively associated with releasing time, which 
indicates an increase in reporting days after this new rule. Consistent with prior studies (Sengupta 2004; Ajinkya et 
al. 2004), releasing days are positively correlated with BADNEWS and LOSS, suggesting that unexpected delay in 
releasing earnings is longer for firms disclosing bad news or loss. Analyst following (N_ANA) is negatively 
correlated with releasing time, indicating that analysts prefer to follow firms with good stock performance and are 
averse to high uncertainty. As expected the correlation between releasing time and size is highly significant. 
Meanwhile, most correlations are significant at the 5% level except for the correction between releasing time and 
forecast dispersion, releasing time and MB, releasing time and CONS, MB and POST_FD, LOSS and CLC, forecast 
dispersion and MB, and forecast dispersion and the number of analyst following. 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
5.1. Univariate Results 
 
Table 4 presents univariate analysis of the releasing time for the OPC and CLC firms in both pre- and post-
FD periods. Pairwise t-tests of the statistical differences among the two groups of firms in the two periods are also 
presented using the Satterthwaite test to allow for the statistically significant inequality of group variances.  
 
A comparison of the results shows a significant difference between OPC and CLC groups in terms of the 
average number of annual reporting days (32.03 and 37.04 respectively) in the pre-FD period, consistent with 
hypothesis 2. That indicates the CLC firms provided more information to the market through certain financial 
analysts and big investors during the closed conference calls as compared to the open conference calls, and 
therefore, the CLC firms were willing to put off the timing of earnings announcements compared to the OPC firms 
before Regulation FD. Similarly, the differences among the two groups with respect to the average number of annual 
reporting days (33.05 and 38.52) are statistically significant after the release of Regulation FD, which support 
hypothesis 3. Since the test for the equity of variance showed unequal variance, the Satterthwaite unequal variance t-
test was used, and all t values are significant for each comparison. Overall, these results indicate OPC firms need 
less time to release their annual earnings report compared to CLC firms, and both groups are more likely to delay 
their annual earnings announcements after the implementation of Regulation FD.  
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5.2. Group-Specific Effect  
 
One limitation of univariate tests is that observed differences, even if statistically significant, could be 
driven by other explanatory factors besides the one that is of interest. Indeed, on an ex-ante basis, it can be argued 
that annual releasing time should not change for the OPC group since Regulation FD should conceptually not impact 
them. To check the validity of this reasoning, we estimated an OLS version of Equation (1) restricted to each group. 
Since Regulation FD may have changed a firm’s conference call status, the regression results for each period are 
presented as well. Regression Results by groups and periods are presented in Table 5.  
 
Panel A of Table 5 presents the regression results for each group, while Panel B presents the results for 
each period separately. The variable of interest from Panel A is POST, the dummy variable representing the post- 
FD period. Note that, for both CLC and OPC groups, POST is statistically significant and positive, which implies 
that the adoption of Regulation FD is associated with an increase in earnings releasing time for both OPC and CLC 
groups in the post-FD period. 
 
In contrast, from Panel B of Table 5, the variable of interest is CLC, the dummy variable representing the 
CLC group. During both pre- and post-FD periods, the coefficients on CLC are significant and positive, indicating 
CLC firms delay to report their annual earnings in both pre- and post-FD periods. This is consistent with the finding 
of Bushee, Matsumoto and Miller (2004: 617), which shows that Regulation FD had a significant negative effect on 
managers’ decisions to continue hosting conference calls.  This can be explained in the fact that, when the previous 
CLC firms had to change their closed conference calls to open conference calls due to Regulation FD, they 
encountered more difficulty in releasing their annual earnings and spent more processing time to make it available to 
the public than OPC firms in the post-FD period. 
 
Finally, all the control variables have the expected signs. In particular, VOL and TECH are negatively 
associated with the releasing time. Both BADNEWS and LOSS are significant and positive in all cases, consistent 
with prior findings that unexpected delay in releasing earnings is longer for firms disclosing bad news (e.g. 
Baginski, Koss and Watts, 2002: 1275; Begley and Fischer, 1998: 347; Ajinkya et al., 2004: 343). N_ANA is 
negative in all cases, consistent with an expectation that the greater the number of analysts following a firm, the 
lesser the number of releasing days since firms are forced to release their earnings to the public to avoid the negative 
impact of noisy information from financial analysts on the market.  LSALES is also negatively related to the 
releasing time, consistent with the notion that as more information is disclosed for a large firm, it is more likely that 
managers are willing to report their annual earnings. Thus for the OPC and CLC groups, apparently greater 
environmental uncertainty is associated with less delay in earnings release. Other control variables such as DISP, 
SPECIAL, and MB, have the signs consistent with prior expectations as well.  
 
In conclusion, analyses of each individual group and period provide results consistent with our expectations 
about the effect of Regulation FD.  
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Table 4 
Univariate Analysis of Releasing Time by Class and Period in Pre and Post Regulation FD Periods 
  
CLASS 
  
Row-wise 
   
  
OPC CLC 
 
means 
   PRE Regulation FD Period 
 
32.03 37.04 
 
35.36 
   Number of observations 
 
1,243 2,462 
 
3705 
            POST Regulation FD Period 
 
33.05 38.52 
 
36.63 
   Number of observations 
 
1,582 2,994 
 
4576 
            Column-wise means 
 
32.60 37.85 
     Number of observations  2,825 5,456 
  
   
         Column-wise mean comparison  
       Difference (CLC less OPC) 
 
5.2508   Releasing Time in CLC firms > OPC firms 
 Satterthwaite t-value 
 
18.19 (i.e., CLC firms delay to announce their annual reports compared to OPC firms) 
Probability 
 
<0.0001 
               Row-wise mean comparison 
        Difference (POST less PRE) 
 
1.269   Releasing Time in POST period > PRE period 
Satterthwaite t-value 
 
4.44 (i.e., more releasing time in POST period) 
 Probability 
 
<0.0001 
               
  
Error 
      Type III ANOVA Tests  Mean Square F-ratio Probability 
 
  
POST_FD 
 
726.00 4.49 
 
0.0314 
   CLASS (OPC  and CLC) 
 
20742.00 128.36 
 
<0.0001 
   POST_FD*CLASS (Interaction) 
 
96.14 0.59 
 
0.44 
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Table 5 
Regression of Releasing Time on Hypothesized Determinants by Class and Period, Separately 
  
CLASS 
     
PERIOD 
     
 
Expected OPC group 
  
CLC group 
  
PRE Regulation FD Period 
 
POST Regulation FD Period 
 
sign Coefficient T-value 
 
Coefficient T-value 
 
Coefficient T-value 
  
Coefficient T-value 
Intercept ? 47.01 36.6*** 
 
48.02 50.79*** 
 
45.73 37.64*** 
  
48.87 42.34*** 
POST_FD ? 2.35 5.28*** 
 
1.75 4.8*** 
       CLC + 
      
2.84 6.59*** 
  
3.36 8.8*** 
VOL - -0.55 -5.34*** 
 
-0.14 -1.31 
 
-0.71 -5.26*** 
  
-0.21 -2.16* 
TECH - -6.12 -12.1*** 
 
-3.06 -6.37*** 
 
-3.52 -6.24*** 
  
-4.32 -9.38*** 
MB + -0.02 -1.35 
 
0.02 1.42 
 
0.01 1.08 
  
-0.02 -1.21 
CONS + 2.25 2.19* 
 
1.10 1.46 
 
2.95 3.33*** 
  
0.53 0.62 
SPECIAL + 0.91 1.98* 
 
0.58 1.66 
 
1.02 2.45* 
  
0.51 1.32 
LSALES - -1.66 -9.14*** 
 
-1.17 -8.42*** 
 
-1.53 -8.56*** 
  
-1.37 -9.6*** 
BADNEWS + 0.58 1.22 
 
2.23 6.06*** 
 
1.63 3.82*** 
  
1.74 4.23*** 
LOSS + -0.99 -1.12 
 
3.90 5.48*** 
 
3.47 3.2** 
  
1.91 2.86** 
DISP + 4.69 1.47 
 
9.05 3.94*** 
 
7.47 2.52* 
  
7.90 3.16** 
N_ANA - -0.12 -3.37*** 
 
-0.45 -13.78*** 
 
-0.27 -7.58*** 
  
-0.34 -9.91*** 
              Adjusted R-square (%) 15.24 
  
13.7 
  
16.18 
   
16.21 
 Number of observations 2,825 
  
5,456 
  
3,705 
   
4,576 
 *** Probability of below 0.001.           
** Probability of below 0.01.           
* Probability of below 0.05.           
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5.3. Multivariate Results  
 
The results from the separate group analysis indicated that Regulation FD had an effect on both CLC and 
OPC groups. To determine if this effect would still be observed if the sample were pooled together, we estimated 
Model (1) using as the OPC firms as the control group. The results are presented in Table 6 below. 
 
 
Table 6 
Results of Pooled Regression of Releasing Time on Hypothesized Determinants in Pre and Post Regulation FD Periods 
 
Expected 
      
 
sign Coefficient T-value 
    Intercept ? 46.19 55.01*** 
    
        Regulation FD effects 
       POST_FD ? 1.67 3.62*** 
    CLC + 2.73 6.48*** 
    POST_FD*CLC ? 0.72 1.3 
    
        Control Variables 
       VOL - -0.37 -4.8*** 
    TECH - -4.19 -11.8*** 
    MB + -0.01 0.9 
    CONS + 1.63 2.67** 
    SPECIAL + 0.69 2.45* 
    LSALES - -1.42 -12.8*** 
    BADNEWS + 1.70 5.77*** 
    LOSS + 2.38 4.26*** 
    DISP + 8.23 4.37*** 
    N_ANA - -0.30 -12.4*** 
    
        Adjusted R-square(%) 
 
16.31 
     Number of observations 
 
8,281 
     F-test for Equalities in CLC and Control firms 
     
  
F-value Probability     
  CLC+POST_FD*CLC = 0 
 
84.36 <0.0001 
    Inference: CLC and OPC firms are significant different in POST_FD period 
*** Probability of below 0.001; ** Probability of below 0.01; * Probability of below 0.05. 
 
 
Table 6 presents regression results where the effect of the potential cross-sectional dependence of the 
residuals stemming from the multiple observations for the same firm is controlled. First, CONS, BADNEWS, DISP, 
LOSS, and SPECIAL have significant positive influence on the RELEASING_TIME observed. Thus, an increase in 
sales concentration, disagreements among financial analysts, bad news and complexity of accounting are associated 
with an increase in releasing days. Second, N_ANA, LSALES and TECH are significantly negative related to the 
RELEASING_TIME, which is consistent with the expectation that a firm is likely to make a timely earning release 
if it is a large firm, has more analysts covering the firm, and faces more litigation risks.  
 
More importantly, the adoption of Regulation FD appears to have had a fairly specific effect. The variance 
inflation factors (VIF) of all the variables used in Model (1) are below 2, which exclude the existence of 
multicollinearity. The coefficient of POST is statistically significant and positive, and therefore, in the combined 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2011 Volume 27, Number 6 
© 2011 The Clute Institute  35 
CLC and OPC sample, there is some indication of an increased releasing time overall, which supports Hypothesis 1. 
It confirms the result reported earlier in Table 5, shows a statistically significant increase in the releasing time for 
the OPC and CLC groups in the post-FD period compared to the Pre-FD period. Thus, the positive sign for CLC 
indicates that the CLC group needs more time to release earnings relative to the OPC group when other factors are 
controlled for, consistent with Hypothesis 2. However, the coefficient on POST_CLC is not significantly different 
from zero, which suggests that open and close-call firms both increase their delays in the post-FD period (as POST 
is significantly positive), but not by different amounts.  The combined coefficient of CLC + POST_CLC is 
significantly different from zero by a standard F-test. It indicates there is still a significant difference in the releasing 
time between the CLC group and the OPC group in the post-FD period, although the increased amount is not 
significantly different between these two groups. It supports Hypothesis 3.   
 
5.4. Robustness Tests 
 
Due to a stricter institutional environment enacted after the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act in 2002, we also 
examine the impact of SOX on managerial earnings releasing time. We replace POST_FD dummy variable with 
POST_SOX dummy variable in model (1). The coefficient on the interaction between SOX and CLC is not 
significant, and the combined coefficient of CLC + POST_SOX_CLC is significantly different from zero, which 
indicates the difference in releasing time between the CLC group and OPC group does not disappear in the 
post_SOX period (after 2002). We have omitted the tabulated results for the sake of brevity, but they are 
qualitatively the same as the findings reported earlier. 
 
Meanwhile, to isolate the SOX impact from our studies, we rerun the regression using a subsample of 
1993-2002 observations only. The results are consistent with the current findings, so we did not tabulate those 
results for the sake of brevity.   
 
Taken together, our study provides evidence that Regulation FD have had a significant impact on 
management earnings disclosure timing. We find the enactment of Regulation FD exacerbated the delay of the 
annual earnings announcements for both CLC and OPC firms.   
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
The main objective of this study is to investigate the impact of Regulation FD on managerial decisions on 
earnings releasing time. We isolate the influence of Regulation FD by splitting the data into two groups: CLC firms 
versus OPC firms in order to control for other time-period-specific factors. We find that both OPC firms and CLC 
firms delay reporting their annual earnings in the post-FD period as compared to the pre-FD period, indicating an 
unintended consequence of Regulation FD on firm’s disclosure decisions. An unexpected delay in earnings releasing 
time is longer for CLC firms as compared to OPC firms. Further, such a significant difference in the disclosure 
timing between OPC and CLC groups does not disappear in the post-FD period.  
 
This study contributes to the literature as follows. This study is the first attempt to examine the disclosure 
timing choice in the context of Regulation FD. Second, we isolate the influence of Regulation FD by splitting the 
data into two groups: CLC firms versus OPC firms in order to control for other time-period-specific factors; and 
separate the effect of SOX by adding a dummy variable in the post-FD period. Third, we expanded the post-FD 
period to five years to examine the mid-to-long-term effect of Regulation FD, whereas most other studies use only a 
one or two-year short-term window.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Variable Definition 
 
RELEASING_TIME= The number of calendar days between the fiscal-year end and the date of the actual annual earnings  
 
announcement for firm i at year t. 
   POST_FD= Dummy variable for the period after the issue of Regulation FD in 2000. 
 CLC= Dummy variable for firms which held closed conference calls in the periods before Regulation FD 
 
was adopted. 
     VOL= Total number of shares traded over the fiscal year divided by total shares outstanding at fiscal year end. 
 
1 if a firm belongs to Drugs (Compustat SIC codes 2833-2836), R&D Services (8731-8734), Programming  
(7371-7379).  
TECH= Computers (3570-3577), Electronics (3600-2674); 0 otherwise (See Sengupta 2004). 
MB= The ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity at the end of year i. 
CONS= 
Sales of the 5 largest firms within a two-digit SIC code divided by total sales of all firms within the  
two-digit SIC code. 
SPECIAL= 1 if a firm had report non-zero special items in its annual report; 0, otherwise. 
LSALES= Log of total sales for the fiscal year. 
   BADNEWS= 1 if the actual EPS is less than the consensus forecast (median) for firm i at year t; 
LOSS= 1 if the actual EPS of firm i is less than zero; 0 otherwise. 
 DISP= Standard deviation of analyst forecasts for firm i from the mean of analysts’ forecasts deflated  
 
by the median of analyst forecast for firm i.  
  N_ANA= Total number of earnings forecasts outstanding for a firm for quarter t. 
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